diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index edc7bac..503c6d6 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -3,3 +3,6 @@
*.mmd.svg
publish
node_modules
+!solospec/index.html
+solospec/.spec-issues-cache.json
+solospec/dist
diff --git a/solospec/config.json b/solospec/config.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8dffe40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/solospec/config.json
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+{
+ "bikeshed": {
+ "modified": "[DATE]",
+ "title": "Solid-OIDC",
+ "boilerplate": "issues-index no",
+ "shortname": "solid-oidc",
+ "level": "1",
+ "status": "CG-DRAFT",
+ "group": "solidcg",
+ "ed": "https://solid.github.io/solid-oidc/",
+ "tr": "https://solidproject.org/TR/oidc",
+ "created": "July 16, 2021",
+ "repository": "https://github.com/solid/solid-oidc",
+ "inlinegithubissues": "title",
+ "markupshorthands": "markdown yes",
+ "maxtocdepth": "2",
+ "editor": [
+ {
+ "name": "Aaron Coburn",
+ "url": "https://people.apache.org/~acoburn/#i",
+ "company": "Inrupt",
+ "companyUrl": "https://inrupt.com"
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "elf Pavlik",
+ "url": "https://elf-pavlik.hackers4peace.net"
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Christoph Braun (Forschungszentrum Informatik (FZI))"
+ }
+ ],
+ "testsuite": "https://solid-contrib.github.io/solid-oidc-tests/",
+ "metadataorder": "This version, Latest published version, Test Suite, Created, Modified, *, !*",
+ "biblio": {
+ "DPOP": {
+ "title": "OAuth 2.0 Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer (DPoP)",
+ "url": "https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop",
+ "authors": [
+ "D. Fett",
+ "B. Campbell",
+ "J. Bradley",
+ "T. Lodderstedt",
+ "M. Jones",
+ "D. Waite"
+ ],
+ "publisher": "IETF"
+ },
+ "OIDC-CORE": {
+ "title": "OpenID Connect Core 1.0",
+ "url": "https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html",
+ "authors": [
+ "N. Sakimura",
+ "J. Bradley",
+ "M. Jones",
+ "B. de Medeiros",
+ "C. Mortimore"
+ ],
+ "publisher": "The OpenID Foundation"
+ },
+ "OIDC-DISCOVERY": {
+ "title": "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0",
+ "url": "https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html",
+ "authors": [
+ "N. Sakimura",
+ "J. Bradley",
+ "M. Jones",
+ "E. Jay"
+ ],
+ "publisher": "The OpenID Foundation"
+ },
+ "OIDC-DYNAMIC-CLIENT-REGISTRATION": {
+ "title": "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0",
+ "url": "https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-registration-1_0.html",
+ "authors": [
+ "N. Sakimura",
+ "J. Bradley",
+ "M.B. Jones"
+ ],
+ "publisher": "The OpenID Foundation"
+ },
+ "SOLID-PROTOCOL": {
+ "title": "Solid Protocol",
+ "url": "https://solidproject.org/TR/protocol",
+ "authors": [
+ "Sarven Capadisli",
+ "Tim Berners-Lee",
+ "Ruben Verborgh",
+ "Kjetil Kjernsmo",
+ "Justin Bingham",
+ "Dmitri Zagidulin"
+ ],
+ "publisher": "W3C Solid Community Group"
+ },
+ "SOLID-OIDC-PRIMER": {
+ "title": "Solid-OIDC Primer",
+ "url": "https://solid.github.io/solid-oidc/primer/",
+ "authors": [
+ "Jackson Morgan",
+ "Aaron Coburn",
+ "Matthieu Bosquet"
+ ],
+ "publisher": "W3C Solid Community Group"
+ },
+ "WEBID": {
+ "title": "WebID 1.0",
+ "url": "https://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/webid/spec/identity/",
+ "authors": [
+ "Andrei Sambra",
+ "Henry Story",
+ "Tim Berners-Lee"
+ ],
+ "publisher": "WebID Incubator Group"
+ },
+ "UMA": {
+ "title": "User-Managed Access (UMA) 2.0 Grant for OAuth 2.0 Authorization",
+ "url": "https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/wg/rec-oauth-uma-grant-2.0.html",
+ "authors": [
+ "Eve Maler",
+ "Maciej Machulak",
+ "Justin Richer"
+ ],
+ "publisher": "Kantara Initiative, Inc"
+ },
+ "BCP195": {
+ "title": "Best Current Practice 195",
+ "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195",
+ "publisher": "IETF"
+ }
+ }
+ },
+ "custom": {
+ "formereditor": [
+ {
+ "name": "Dmitri Zagidulin",
+ "url": "http://computingjoy.com/"
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Adam Migus",
+ "url": "https://migusgroup.com/about/",
+ "company": "The Migus Group",
+ "companyUrl": "https://migusgroup.com/"
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "Ricky White",
+ "url": "https://rickywhite.net",
+ "company": "The Migus Group",
+ "companyUrl": "https://migusgroup.com/"
+ }
+ ],
+ "copyright": "Copyright © [YEAR] the Contributors to the [TITLE],\npublished by the Solid Community Group \nunder the W3C Community Contributor License Agreement (CLA) .\nA human-readable summary is available.",
+ "logo": {
+ "href": "https://www.w3.org/",
+ "src": "https://www.w3.org/StyleSheets/TR/2021/logos/W3C",
+ "alt": "W3C",
+ "height": "48",
+ "width": "72"
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/solospec/includes/abstract.md b/solospec/includes/abstract.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f89c40a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/solospec/includes/abstract.md
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+## Abstract {data-no-toc}
+
+The Solid OpenID Connect (Solid-OIDC) specification defines how resource servers
+verify the identity of relying parties and end users based on the authentication
+performed by an OpenID provider. Solid-OIDC builds on top of OpenID Connect 1.0
+for use within the Solid ecosystem.
diff --git a/solospec/includes/conformance.md b/solospec/includes/conformance.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60a523c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/solospec/includes/conformance.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+## Conformance {#w3c-conformance data-no-toc-count}
+
+### Document conventions {#w3c-conventions}
+
+Conformance requirements are expressed
+with a combination of descriptive assertions
+and RFC 2119 terminology.
+The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL”
+in the normative parts of this document
+are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
+However, for readability,
+these words do not appear in all uppercase letters in this specification.
+
+All of the text of this specification is normative
+except sections explicitly marked as non-normative, examples, and notes. [[!RFC2119]]
+
+Examples in this specification are introduced with the words “for example”
+or are set apart from the normative text
+with class="example",
+like this:
+
+
+
This is an example of an informative example.
+
class="note",
+like this:
+
+Note, this is an informative note.
diff --git a/solospec/includes/status.md b/solospec/includes/status.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e77210
--- /dev/null
+++ b/solospec/includes/status.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+## Status of this document {data-no-toc}
+
+This report was published by the Solid Community Group .
+It is not a W3C Standard nor is it on the W3C Standards Track.
+Please note that under the W3C Community Contributor License Agreement (CLA)
+there is a limited opt-out and other conditions apply.
+Learn more about W3C Community and Business Groups .
+
diff --git a/solospec/index.html b/solospec/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3337d26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/solospec/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+
+
+
+ solid-oidc
+
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/solospec/index.md b/solospec/index.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77dc4e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/solospec/index.md
@@ -0,0 +1,561 @@
+:::include ./includes/abstract.md :::
+:::include ./includes/status.md :::
+
+## Introduction {#intro}
+
+*This section is non-normative*
+
+The [Solid project](https://solidproject.org/) aims to change the way web applications work today to
+improve privacy and user control of personal data by utilizing current standards, protocols, and
+tools, to facilitate building extensible and modular decentralized applications based on
+[Linked Data](https://www.w3.org/standards/semanticweb/data) principles.
+
+This specification is written for Authorization and Resource Server owners intending to implement
+Solid-OIDC. It is also useful to Solid application developers charged with implementing a Solid-OIDC
+client.
+
+The OAuth 2.0 [[!RFC6749]] and OpenID Connect Core 1.0 [[!OIDC-CORE]] web standards were
+published in October 2012 and November 2014, respectively. Since publication they've seen rapid and
+widespread adoption across the industry, in turn gaining extensive *"real-world"* data and
+experience. The strengths of the protocols are now clear; however, in a changing eco-system where
+privacy and control of digital identities are becoming more pressing concerns, it is also clear
+that additional functionality is required.
+
+The additional functionality documented herein aims to address:
+
+1. Resource servers and their Authorization servers having no existing trust relationship with identity providers.
+2. Ephemeral Clients as a first-order use-case.
+
+### Out of Scope {#intro-out-of-scope}
+
+*This section is non-normative*
+
+While the Solid-OIDC specification describes the structure of an ID Token for use in Solid, the definition of a global access token for use with Solid Resource Servers is beyond the scope of this specification.
+
+## Terminology {#terms}
+
+*This section is non-normative*
+
+This specification uses the terms "access token", "authorization server", "resource server" (RS), "token endpoint",
+"grant type", and "client" as defined by The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [[!RFC6749]].
+
+Throughout this specification, we will use the term OpenID Provider (OP) in line with the
+terminology used in the Open ID Connect Core 1.0 specification (OIDC) [[!OIDC-CORE]].
+It should be noted that this is distinct from the entity referred to as an Authorization Server
+by the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework (OAuth) [[!RFC6749]].
+
+This specification also uses the following terms:
+
+
+*WebID* as defined by [[!WEBID]]
+
+ A WebID is a URI with an HTTP or HTTPS scheme which denotes an Agent (Person, Organization, Group,
+ Device, etc.).
+
+*JSON Web Token (JWT)* as defined by [[!RFC7519]]
+
+ A string representing a set of claims as a JSON object that is encoded in a JWS or JWE, enabling the
+ claims to be digitally signed or MACed and/or encrypted.
+
+*JSON Web Key (JWK)* as defined by [[!RFC7517]]
+
+ A JSON object that represents a cryptographic key. The members of the object represent properties of
+ the key, including its value.
+
+*Demonstration of Proof-of-Possession at the Application Layer (DPoP)* as defined by [[!DPOP]]
+
+ A mechanism for sender-constraining OAuth tokens via a proof-of-possession mechanism on the
+ application level.
+
+*DPoP Proof* as defined by [[!DPOP]]
+
+ A DPoP proof is a JWT that is signed (using JWS) using a private key chosen by the client.
+
+*Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE)* as defined by [[!RFC7636]]
+
+ An extension to the Authorization Code flow which mitigates the risk of an authorization code
+ interception attack.
+
+
+
+## Core Concepts {#concepts}
+
+*This section is non-normative*
+
+In a decentralized ecosystem, such as Solid, an OP may be an identity-as-a-service vendor or, at
+the other end of the spectrum, a user-controlled OP. In either case, the user may be authenticating
+from a browser or an application.
+
+Therefore, this specification assumes the use of the
+[Authorization Code Flow](https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#CodeFlowSteps) with
+PKCE, in accordance with OAuth and OIDC best practices. It is also assumed that there are no
+preexisting trust relationships with the OP. This means that client registration, whether dynamic,
+or static, is entirely optional.
+
+### WebIDs {#concepts-webids}
+
+*This section is non-normative*
+
+In line with Linked Data principles, a WebID is a HTTP URI that,
+when dereferenced, resolves to a profile document that is structured data in an
+[RDF 1.1 format](https://www.w3.org/TR/rdf11-concepts/). This profile document allows
+people to link with others to grant access to identity resources as they see fit. WebIDs underpin
+Solid and are used as a primary identifier for Users in this specification.
+
+## Basic Flow {#basic-flow}
+
+*This section is non-normative*
+
+Details of the flow are available in [[!SOLID-OIDC-PRIMER]]
+
+
+ :::include ./sequence.mmd:::
+ Basic sequence of authenticating the user and the client.
+
+
+## Client Identifiers {#clientids}
+
+OAuth and OIDC require the Client application to identify itself to the OP and RS by presenting a
+[client identifier](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2.2) (Client ID). Solid applications
+SHOULD use a URI that can be dereferenced as a [Client ID Document](#clientids-document).
+
+Issue(78):
+
+### Client ID Document {#clientids-document}
+
+When a Client Identifier is dereferenced, the resource MUST be serialized as an `application/ld+json` document
+unless content negotiation requires a different outcome.
+
+The serialized JSON form of a Client ID Document MUST use the normative JSON-LD `@context`
+provided at `https://www.w3.org/ns/solid/oidc-context.jsonld` such that the resulting
+document produces a JSON serialization of an OIDC client registration, per the
+definition of client registration metadata from [[!RFC7591]] section 2.
+
+Also, the OP MUST dereference the Client ID Document and match any Client-supplied parameters
+with the values in the Client ID Document.
+
+Further, the `redirect_uri` provided by the Client MUST be included in the registration `redirect_uris`
+list.
+
+This example uses [JSON-LD ](https://www.w3.org/TR/json-ld/) for the Client ID Document:
+
+
+
https://app.example/id
+
+```jsonld
+{
+ "@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/solid/oidc-context.jsonld"],
+ "client_id": "https://app.example/id",
+ "client_name": "Solid Application Name",
+ "redirect_uris": ["https://app.example/callback"],
+ "post_logout_redirect_uris": ["https://app.example/logout"],
+ "client_uri": "https://app.example/",
+ "logo_uri" : "https://app.example/logo.png",
+ "tos_uri" : "https://app.example/tos.html",
+ "scope" : "openid profile offline_access webid",
+ "grant_types" : ["refresh_token","authorization_code"],
+ "response_types" : ["code"],
+ "default_max_age" : 3600,
+ "require_auth_time" : true
+ }
+```
+
+
+```jsonld {9}
+{
+ "client_name": "S-C-A Browser Demo Client App",
+ "application_type": "web",
+ "redirect_uris": [
+ "https://dynamic-client.example/auth"
+ ],
+ "subject_type": "pairwise",
+ "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
+ "scope" : "openid profile offline_access webid"
+ }
+```
+
+
+## WebID Profile {#webid-profile}
+
+Dereferencing the WebID URL results in a WebID Profile.
+
+Issue(76):
+
+### OIDC Issuer Discovery {#oidc-issuer-discovery}
+
+A WebID Profile lists the OpenID Providers who are trusted to issue tokens on behalf
+of the agent who controls the WebID. This prevents a malicious OpenID Provider from issuing
+otherwise valid ID Tokens for arbitrary WebIDs. An entity that verifies ID Tokens will use this
+mechanism to determine if the issuer is authoritative for the given WebID.
+
+
+
+```turtle
+PREFIX solid:
+ <#id> solid:oidcIssuer .
+```
+WebID Profile specifying an OIDC issuer
+
+
+To discover a list of valid issuers, the WebID Profile MUST be checked for the existence of statements matching
+
+```sparql
+?webid ?iss .
+```
+
+where `?webid` is set to WebID. The `?iss` will result in an IRI denoting valid issuer for that WebID.
+The WebID Profile Document MUST include one or more statements matching the OIDC issuer pattern.
+
+Issue(80):
+
+Issue(92):
+
+Issue(91):
+
+#### OIDC Issuer Discovery via Link Headers {#oidc-issuer-discovery-link-headers}
+
+A server hosting a WebID Profile Document MAY transmit the `http://www.w3.org/ns/solid/terms#oidcIssuer`
+values via Link Headers, but they MUST be the same as in the RDF representation.
+A client MUST treat the RDF in the body of the WebID Profile as canonical
+but MAY use the Link Header values as an optimization.
+
+
+
+```http
+Link: ;
+ rel="http://www.w3.org/ns/solid/terms#oidcIssuer";
+ anchor="#id"
+```
+HTTP response Link Header (line breaks added for readibility)
+
+
+## Requesting the WebID Claim using a Scope Value {#webid-scope}
+
+Solid-OIDC uses scope values, as defined in [[!RFC6749]] Section 3.3 and [[!OIDC-CORE]] Section 5.4 to specify
+what information is made available as Claim Values.
+
+Solid-OIDC defines the following `scope` value for use with claim requests:
+
+
+*webid*
+
+ REQUIRED. This scope requests access to the End-User's `webid` Claim.
+
+
+
+## Issuer Validation after receiving the Authorization Code {#iss-check}
+
+In accordance with Best Current Practice [[RFC9700]],
+defense against [Mix-Up Attacks](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9700.html#section-4.4)
+is required in Solid-OIDC as clients are expected to interact with more than one OP.
+To this end, this specification adopts the mechanism defined in [[!RFC9207]].
+
+The OP MUST include the `iss` query parameter alongside the authorization code when redirecting the user agent back to the Client's redirect\_uri.
+The value of the `iss` parameter MUST be the Issuer Identifier of the OP, as defined in [[OIDC-CORE]].
+
+
+
+```http
+HTTP/1.1 302 Found
+Location: https://client.example.com/callback?
+ code=n0esc392ae491076
+ &state=af0ifjsldkj
+ &iss=https%3A%2F%2Fidp.example.com
+```
+Example Authorization Response including the `iss` query parameter
+
+
+Upon receiving the authorization response, the Client MUST validate the `iss` parameter:
+
+* The Client MUST check for the presence of the `iss` parameter.
+* The Client MUST verify that the `iss` value matches the Issuer Identifier of the OP to which the authorization request was sent.
+
+If the `iss` parameter is missing or does not match the expected value, the Client MUST reject the response, MUST NOT exchange the authorization code for tokens, and SHOULD signal an error to the user.
+
+## Token Instantiation {#tokens}
+
+Assuming one of the following options
+
+* Client ID and Secret, and valid DPoP Proof (for dynamic and static registration)
+* Dereferencable Client Identifier with a proper Client ID Document and valid DPoP Proof (for a Solid client identifier)
+
+the OP MUST return A DPoP-bound OIDC ID Token.
+
+### DPoP-bound OIDC ID Token {#tokens-id}
+
+When requesting a DPoP-bound OIDC ID Token, the Client MUST send a DPoP proof JWT
+that is valid according to the [[DPOP#section-5]]. The DPoP proof JWT is used to
+bind the OIDC ID Token to a public key. See also: [[!DPOP]].
+
+With the `webid` scope, the DPoP-bound OIDC ID Token payload MUST contain these claims:
+
+* `webid` — The WebID claim MUST be the user's WebID.
+* `iss` — The issuer claim MUST be a valid URL of the OP
+ instantiating this token.
+* `aud` — The audience claim MUST be an array of values.
+ The values MUST include the authorized party claim `azp`
+ and the string `solid`.
+ In the decentralized world
+ of Solid-OIDC, the audience of an ID Token is not only the client (`azp`),
+ but also any Solid Authorization Server at any accessible address
+ on the world wide web (`solid`). See also: [[RFC7519#section-4.1.3]].
+* `azp` - The authorized party claim is used to identify the client
+ (See also: [section 5. Client Identifiers](#clientids)).
+* `iat` — The issued-at claim is the time at which the DPoP-bound
+ OIDC ID Token was issued.
+* `exp` — The expiration claim is the time at which the DPoP-bound
+ OIDC ID Token becomes invalid.
+* `cnf` — The confirmation claim is used to identify the DPoP Public
+ Key bound to the OIDC ID Token. See also: [[DPOP#section-7]].
+
+
+
An example OIDC ID Token:
+
+```json
+{
+ "webid": "https://janedoe.com/web#id",
+ "iss": "https://idp.example.com",
+ "sub": "janedoe",
+ "aud": ["https://client.example.com/client_id", "solid"],
+ "azp": "https://client.example.com/client_id",
+ "iat": 1311280970,
+ "exp": 1311281970,
+ "cnf":{
+ "jkt":"0ZcOCORZNYy-DWpqq30jZyJGHTN0d2HglBV3uiguA4I"
+ }
+ }
+```
+
401 status code,
+and a WWW-Authenticate HTTP header. See also: [[RFC9110]](11.6.1. WWW-Authenticate)
+
+The WWW-Authenticate HTTP header MUST include an as\_uri
+parameter unless the authentication scheme requires a different mechanism
+for discovering an associated authorization server.
+
+Authorization Servers SHOULD implement User-Managed Access (UMA) 2.0 Grant for
+OAuth 2.0 Authorization [[!UMA]].
+
+### Obtaining an Access Token {#obtaining-access-token}
+
+For Authorization Servers that conform to [[!UMA]], the http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1\_0.html#IDToken profile MUST
+be supported. This profile MUST be advertised in the uma\_profiles\_supported
+metadata of the Authorization Server discovery document [[UMA#rfc.section.2]].
+
+When using the http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1\_0.html#IDToken
+profile with an UMA-based Authorization Server, the Authorization Server MUST be capable
+of exchanging a valid Solid-OIDC ID Token [[#tokens-id]] for an OAuth 2.0 Access Token.
+
+Note: Clients can push additional claims by requesting an upgraded RPT [[UMA#rfc.section.3.3.1]]
+
+Authorization Server MUST pefrom [[#dpop-validation]] and [[#id-token-validation]]
+
+### DPoP Validation {#dpop-validation}
+
+A DPoP Proof that is valid according to
+[DPoP Internet-Draft, Section 4.3](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04#section-4.3),
+MUST be present when a DPoP-bound OIDC ID Token is used.
+
+The DPoP-bound OIDC ID Token MUST be validated according to
+[DPoP Internet-Draft, Section 6](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04#section-6),
+but the AS MAY perform additional verification in order to determine whether to grant access to the
+requested resource.
+
+## Solid-OIDC Conformance Discovery {#discovery}
+
+An OpenID Provider that conforms to the Solid-OIDC specification MUST advertise it in the OpenID Connect
+Discovery 1.0 [[!OIDC-DISCOVERY]] resource by including `webid` in its `scopes_supported` metadata property.
+
+
+
+```json
+{
+ "scopes_supported": ["openid", "offline_access", "webid"]
+ }
+```
+
+
+## Security Considerations {#security}
+
+*This section is non-normative*
+
+As this specification builds upon existing web standards, security considerations from OAuth, OIDC,
+PKCE, and the DPoP specifications may also apply unless otherwise indicated. The following
+considerations should be reviewed by implementors and system/s architects of this specification.
+
+Some of the references within this specification point to documents with a
+Living Standard or Draft status, meaning their contents can still change over
+time. It is advised to monitor these documents, as such changes might have
+security implications.
+
+In addition to above considerations, implementors should consider the Security
+Considerations in context of the Solid Protocol [[!SOLID-PROTOCOL]].
+
+### TLS Requirements {#security-tls}
+
+All TLS requirements outlined in [[BCP195]] apply to this
+specification.
+
+All tokens, Client, and User credentials MUST only be transmitted over TLS.
+
+### Client IDs {#security-client-ids}
+
+An AS SHOULD assign a fixed set of low trust policies to any client identified as anonymous.
+
+Implementors SHOULD expire ephemeral Client IDs that are kept in server storage to mitigate the
+potential for a bad actor to fill server storage with unexpired or otherwise useless Client IDs.
+
+### Client Secrets {#security-client-secrets}
+
+Client secrets SHOULD NOT be stored in browser local storage. Doing so will increase the risk of
+data leaks should an attacker gain access to Client credentials.
+
+### Client Trust {#security-client-trust}
+
+*This section is non-normative*
+
+Clients are ephemeral, client registration is optional, and most Clients cannot keep secrets. These,
+among other factors, are what makes Client trust challenging.
+
+## Privacy Considerations {#privacy}
+
+### OIDC ID Token Reuse {#privacy-token-reuse}
+
+*This section is non-normative*
+
+With JWTs being extendable by design, there is potential for a privacy breach if OIDC ID Tokens get
+reused across multiple authorization servers. It is not unimaginable that a custom claim is added to the
+OIDC ID Token on instantiation. This addition may unintentionally give other authorization servers
+consuming the OIDC ID Token information about the user that they may not wish to share outside of the
+intended AS.
+
+## Acknowledgments {#acknowledgments}
+
+*This section is non-normative*
+
+The Solid Community Group would like to thank the following individuals for reviewing and providing
+feedback on the specification (in alphabetical order):
+
+Tim Berners-Lee, Justin Bingham, Sarven Capadisli, Aaron Coburn, Matthias Evering, Jamie Fiedler,
+Michiel de Jong, Ted Thibodeau Jr, Kjetil Kjernsmo, Mitzi László, Pat McBennett, Adam Migus, Jackson Morgan, Davi
+Ottenheimer, Justin Richer, severin-dsr, Henry Story, Michael Thornburgh, Emmet Townsend, Ruben
+Verborgh, Ricky White, Paul Worrall, Dmitri Zagidulin.
+
+## Appendix A: Full JSON-LD context {#full-jsonld-context}
+
+The JSON-LD context is defined as:
+
+```jsonld
+{
+ "@context": {
+ "@version": 1.1,
+ "@protected": true,
+ "oidc": "http://www.w3.org/ns/solid/oidc#",
+ "xsd": "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#",
+ "client_id": {
+ "@id": "@id",
+ "@type": "@id"
+ },
+ "client_uri": {
+ "@id": "oidc:client_uri",
+ "@type": "@id"
+ },
+ "logo_uri": {
+ "@id": "oidc:logo_uri",
+ "@type": "@id"
+ },
+ "policy_uri": {
+ "@id": "oidc:policy_uri",
+ "@type": "@id"
+ },
+ "tos_uri": {
+ "@id": "oidc:tos_uri",
+ "@type": "@id"
+ },
+ "redirect_uris": {
+ "@id": "oidc:redirect_uris",
+ "@type": "@id",
+ "@container": [
+ "@id",
+ "@set"
+ ]
+ },
+ "require_auth_time": {
+ "@id": "oidc:require_auth_time",
+ "@type": "xsd:boolean"
+ },
+ "default_max_age": {
+ "@id": "oidc:default_max_age",
+ "@type": "xsd:integer"
+ },
+ "application_type": {
+ "@id": "oidc:application_type"
+ },
+ "client_name": {
+ "@id": "oidc:client_name"
+ },
+ "contacts": {
+ "@id": "oidc:contacts"
+ },
+ "grant_types": {
+ "@id": "oidc:grant_types"
+ },
+ "response_types": {
+ "@id": "oidc:response_types"
+ },
+ "scope": {
+ "@id": "oidc:scope"
+ },
+ "token_endpoint_auth_method": {
+ "@id": "oidc:token_endpoint_auth_method"
+ }
+ }
+ }
+```
+
+:::include ./includes/conformance.md :::
+
+